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USSR SURVEY  
23 AUGUST 1951

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THE FAR EAST

Korean War: Indications of Preparation for Long-Term Tensions

Certain aspects of the beaming pattern employed in Soviet comment on the Korean war suggest a desire to encourage long-term resistance and tension. The beaming pattern could also be used as preparation for the resumption of large-scale hostilities.

The volume of comment dropped to a four-month low between 7 and 13 August but, prompted by the 15 August liberation anniversary, returned in the second week to the level maintained since 1 July. The content of this comment is generally familiar in its reliance on Sino-Korean sources and its emphasis on American hypocrisy at Kaesong.

Beaming Patterns: In general, Moscow adheres to the usual practice of concentrating its attack on the morale of American civilians and troops by emphasizing the high rate of losses, the growing opposition to the war, and the profit-seeking motives of the American leaders. But there are variations in less prominent aspects of the beaming which could reflect a plan to encourage long-term tension. One of these variations is the relative increase in the amount of comment on the war beamed to Korean audiences. Another is the emphasis given in Korean-language broadcasts to the certainty of ultimate victory for the Communist cause and to such Communist strength factors as partisan resistance, heroic actions by individuals, and American awareness of Korean strength. Still another variation is the increase, in the second week, of the volume of attention to atrocities in broadcasts to Soviet and Satellite audiences; particular attention is paid to the 14 August "barbaric" raids on Pyongyang. This increase in atrocity propaganda for the home audiences betrays a desire to keep that audience constantly alert to the threat of similar American attacks on Soviet and/or Satellite cities. b

The Kaesong Negotiations: Moscow continues to avoid the Kaesong negotiations in Korean-language broadcasts. This avoidance may be intended to perpetuate Soviet claims to non-interference, but it also serves to avoid propaganda commitment to any concrete results of the negotiations. This week there is no extensive comment on the sessions in English-language broadcasts to the Far East, and this sudden silence in broadcasts presumably intended for United Nations forces could precede a writing-off of the negotiations.

Anniversary Propaganda: The current anniversary of Korea's liberation by Soviet forces receives somewhat more attention than the 1950 anniversary, but exploitation of the event serves the same propaganda purposes as were served in 1950. Most of the comment on the anniversary incorporates attacks on American hypocrisy at Kaesong, and relatively little attention is paid to historical reviews. Kim Il Sung's lengthy anniversary address is not reported in full. Moscow omits his references to Soviet strength--just as it did last year--and concentrates on his references to the negotiations. The address, which closes with the warning that the Americans are as responsible for any breakdown in the negotiations as they have been for the entire war, is broadcast 27 times between 19 and 21 August. Seven of these re-broadcasts are in the Yugoslav languages, although no other beam carries the speech more than three times; it is not broadcast in any Asian languages. b

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